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## THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE STUDY UPON HABITS OF THINKING<sup>1</sup>

### I. THE PROCESS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

Words are symbols for items of mental experience—for perceived objects and for ideas<sup>2</sup>.

Only upon the most concrete level can we isolate a mental experience without tagging it (for subsequent identification) by a verbal symbol, namely, upon the level of individual (particular) unclassified (uncompared) occurrences<sup>3</sup>. Such an occurrence is 'mother' to a child; her uniqueness makes possible the repeated recognition of her with the confidence of a feeling of familiarity prior to any name-association. The same is true, probably, of 'milk-bottle', 'bed', and similar experiences of proprietary contact.

So soon as the child is aware, for example, that there are other beings who more or less resemble 'daddy' and that these have certain likenesses which differentiate them from the remaining phenomena of his environment, a symbol (class-name) by which to mark them off appears to be indispensable. The class-name may be 'daddy' with a mental reservation as to 'my' or 'not my'. But there is little doubt that the recognition without the support and the instrumentality of a class-name of the difference within likeness which constitutes a class or a group is a feat of which the human mind is incapable. Such symbols may be original, temporary, for emergency use, or conventional and permanent. If there be at hand no symbol either conventional or emergent, the cognition of the essential relations which set apart a class or a group, according to all available evidence, is quite impossible<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>This paper is an important contribution on the ever-interesting question of the value of the Classics. See especially Sections III-V, and note 18. For the general attitude of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY toward discussions of the value of the Classics, and toward discussions of methods of teaching the Classics see my remarks in 21.171, note 3 (April 16, 1928). C. K. >

<sup>2</sup>Compare Charles Hubbard Judd, Psychology, Chapter X (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1917); Howard Crosby Warren, Elements of Human Psychology, 315-322 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922); Wilhelm Max Wundt, Introduction to Psychology, translated by Rudolf Pintner, 134 (London, G. Allen and Company, 1912); "...The word ... changes abstract thoughts into concrete ideational processes..."; Wilhelm Max Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, I, Sprache, Chapters III and VII (Leipzig, Kröner, 1917-1923); Friedrich Max Müller, The Science of Thought, Chapters I-II (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1887).

This paper is an attempt merely to apply hypotheses of psychology which are now almost universally accepted. The literature of the subject is vast. The few citations which are made in this and subsequent notes are intended as suggestions for further reading rather than as confirmation of the statements to which they are appended.

<sup>3</sup>Compare Stephen Sheldon Colvin, The Learning Process, 297 (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1912).

<sup>4</sup>Compare John Dewey, How We Think, Chapter XIII, Section 1 (Boston, D. C. Heath and Company, 1910): "...While language is not thought, it is necessary for thinking..."; (page 170), "...A meaning fixed by a linguistic sign is conserved for future use..."; (174), "...This transfer and reapplication is the key to all judgment and inference..."; (174); Harold Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, translated by Mary E. Lowndes, 173 (London, Macmillan and Company, 1908): "...Only by means of the name can the clear and firm nucleus escape confusion with the obscure and changing surroundings..."; F. Max Müller (as cited in note 2, above),

Development of the thinking functions of the mind consists in the building up of hierarchy upon hierarchy—in pyramid form—of generalizations<sup>5</sup>. Starting with purely concrete (individual, particular) experiences (perceptions of objects or of behavior), the mind reaches a new level of power when it becomes aware that these experiences arrange themselves by virtue of inherent similarities and dissimilarities into categories; it reaches a new level again when it becomes aware that these primary categories have inherent attributes which cause them to be grouped in higher categories. This process continues ad infinitum, with many planes of cross-cleavage cutting through previous systematizations. Most often these generalizations do not even reach the focus of consciousness; they are accepted as matter of course. In the higher ranges they involve not only consciousness, but, commonly speaking, effort or at least repetition<sup>6</sup>.

The process of mental development is habit-formation<sup>7</sup>. Only the lowest moron fails to make the simplest categories objects of familiarity in his mental life. The tendency to be aware of the likenesses and the differences by which individual items of experience

<sup>5</sup>29-62; Wilhelm Max Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, translated by Charles Hubbard Judd, 335 (New York, G. E. Stechert and Company, 1897); "...The development of the functions of understanding and the development of speech go hand in hand, and the latter is an indispensable aid in retaining concepts and fixing the operations of thought..."

<sup>6</sup>On the contrary see James Rowland Angell, Psychology, 255-256 (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1910).

<sup>7</sup>See Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution, Chapter XII (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926); Wundt, Introduction to Psychology, Chapter IV (see note 2, above); Boyd Henry Bode, Conflicting Psychologies of Learning, Chapter XV (Boston, D. C. Heath and Company, 1920); Colvin (as cited in note 3, above), 312; Edward Lee Thorndike, Education, 99-101 (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1912); John Dewey, Democracy and Education, Chapters XI, XII (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916). The reader should bear in mind that generalization and judgment are but two aspects of the same process.

A word of caution may be spoken against the prevalent assumption that the mind selects elements of similarity in a number of particular objects and thus arrives at a general idea. A generalization may be defined thus. When a person encounters a particular object, he reacts to it in a more or less definite way in consequence of his previous experience. When he encounters another particular object having some qualities or some characteristics of behavior in common with the former, he transfers a part of his typical reaction from the former to the latter. This habitual reaction in a more or less set form when a person perceives any one of a group of particulars is called a concept. The process is a generalization. One may have a concept of types of behavior quite as well as of static objects; it is important to bear this in mind when we consider predication as the main function of language.

Compare Dewey, How We Think, 127-129, especially 129: "...Conceptions are general because of their use and application, not because of their ingredients... Synthesis is not a matter of mechanical addition, but of application of something discovered in one case to bring other cases into line..."; Colvin (as cited in note 3, above), 302-309; George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1871. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1928).

<sup>8</sup>Compare Dewey, How We Think, 120-122.

The term 'habit' should not be interpreted too narrowly. It means the consolidation and utilization of previous experience, not on one occasion only, but in such a way that the system of reactions of the organism is more or less permanently modified. It need hardly be stated that a judgment is something more than a free association of ideas. None the less, it is a consolidation and utilization of experience, and it results in a more or less permanent modification of the organism.

group and differentiate themselves and to mold one's reactions accordingly is quite certainly innate. Probably it results largely from the interaction of curiosity and the desire to explain the unexplained. Possibly it proceeds further from a self-economizing impulse in the organism. Thus is started a habit of reacting to concepts or symbols instead of only to immediate percepts. With each new stimulation to generalize upon a higher level the system of habits is enlarged and reenforced. It is limited only by mental capacity and by the failure of stimulation.

Habits, however, are specific rather than general<sup>1</sup>. The habit of observing and classifying nuts when one is shelling them under a tree may function little if the action is changed to the observation and the classification of stones. The geologist must work with the materials of geology. In this paper we are concerned only with habits that have as their material the everyday and universal experiences of life.

## II. THE USE AND MISUSE OF SYMBOLS

Symbols are labor-saving devices. One can imagine how far it would be possible to proceed with even the simple formulae of algebra, for instance, if it were necessary to manipulate exclusively particular objects. Under such conditions what could we attain in higher mathematics?<sup>2</sup> So in all fields of mental activity the power of generalization is strictly limited by the range of invention of symbols whereby to represent to the mind the genus. So soon as the symbol is applied, the genus in turn becomes concrete, becomes with other concepts similarly attained the concrete material of a new synthesis. Thus we say that cat, rat, dog, etc., are concrete nouns not because they are the names of individuals (they are not), but because they are upon a lower level of generalization than mammal, animal, organism, entity, being, concept, idea. Each of these becomes a concrete term so soon as it is differentiated from the rest of experience. The burden of carrying the particulars into any considerable number of higher generalizations obviously would quickly overwhelm even the most competent mind<sup>3</sup>.

On the other hand, it is all too easy to manipulate symbols in entire or almost entire unawareness of their meaning, that is, of the content of the groups or genera for which they have become substitutes<sup>4</sup>. We observe this not only in connection with the study of school

<sup>1</sup>The expression 'general habit' appears to be warranted in fact only in the sense that the same or equivalent stimuli occur in various situations. Compare Colvin (as cited in note 3, above), 49, 213, and the references given there.

<sup>2</sup>The effect of the introduction of the Arabic notation upon the development of mathematics is a familiar fact of history.

<sup>3</sup>Compare Dewey, *How We Think*, 122-125.

<sup>4</sup>Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 168: "Words, the counters for ideas, are, however, easily taken for ideas. . . . We are very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning, and to fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations which confer significance. We get so thoroughly used to a kind of pseudo-idea, half perception, that we are not aware how half-dead our mental action is . . ."; Dewey, *How We Think*, 136: ". . . The terms . . . lose their hard-won meaning only too easily if familiar things, and the line of transition from them to the strange, drop out of mind. . . ."; Colvin-Pagley-MacDonald, *Human Behavior*, 210 (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929): ". . . It is necessary to think in symbols. . . . But. . . we must always be able to translate those symbols into the behavior for which they stand".

subjects, but in every-day life, notably in discourse which pretends to be serious, as in the expression of one's 'convictions' and in public speeches—activities somewhat remote from the physical manipulation of concrete objects. Study of the public addresses of prominent men will quickly convince one that error much more frequently arises from this loss of awareness of the meaning of a symbol than from any deficiency in adherence to logical syllogisms<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, *if any training of the human mind is possible which will tend not only to greater power of generalization, but to a higher degree of accuracy in forming judgments, it will be some process of ensuring a more usual awareness of the meaning of symbols*. For a generalization is always the product of a judgment<sup>6</sup>: it is the linking of a relatively concrete object of experience within a more comprehensive class or genus in consequence of desire to explain, observation, comparison.

The relatively generic becomes concrete or specific for further use through familiarity. Awareness of the meaning of a symbol is attained in proportion to the amount of manipulation of the particulars which compose the class or the genus: this is true alike of physical objects and of other items of mental experience. By use the habit of associating the symbol with the content, and vice versa, becomes fixed. *Only by use* does this association become habitual. Because habits are specific, the manipulation must be of the actual objects of the study, whether the concrete material be physical or symbolic. Experience in geology is of little help in the study of mathematics. For the same reason manipulation of algebraic symbols effects little in respect to notions of quantity, if the meaning of the symbols has not been first well attached to them through more concrete experience. We say 'manipulation' for lack of a more satisfactory term; the reader, of course, will understand that it is not physical use, but mental use, however much conditioned by physical contact, that breeds mental familiarity and association<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>5</sup>Ample illustration may be found in the following citations from a single address:

"I favor the policy of economy, not because I wish to save money, but because I wish to save people. . . . Every dollar that we carelessly waste means that their life <i. e. the life of those who toil> will be so much the more meager. Every dollar that we prudently save means that their life will be so much the more abundant. Economy is idealism in its most practical form".

"Under this Republic the rewards of industry belong to those who earn them. . . . The property of the country belongs to the people of the country. . . . They are not required to make any contribution to government expenditures except that which they voluntarily assess upon themselves through the action of their own representatives. Whenever taxes become burdensome, a remedy can be applied by the people; but if they do not act for themselves, no one can be very successful in acting for them".

"The policy of public ownership. . . met with unmistakable defeat. The people declared that they wanted. . . their independence and freedom continued by having the ownership and control of their property not in the government, but in their own hands".

<sup>6</sup>Compare note 5, above.

<sup>7</sup>It would be more nearly correct to say that the meaning of a symbol is the complex of reactions or adjustments which the organism would by habituation experience, if a person—the organism—should encounter any one of the particulars included in the concept. For the purposes of this paper, however, it seems simpler and sufficiently accurate to speak of the meaning as the particulars themselves rather than the organism's typical adjustment to them. The outcome is the same: because an idea is substituted for physical experience, a symbol for an idea, the typical reaction is lost. Compare Colvin (as cited in note 3, above), 298; Warren (as cited in note 2, above), 323.

### III. THE ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE AS TOOLS OF THOUGHT

The units of language, for the most part, are not words, but word-groups. There is comparatively little failure to associate symbol and meaning in the case of the names of physical objects which present themselves to the mind with a high degree of objective invariability. The larger part of language, however, consists not in merely giving names to things, but in predication qualities or attributes of things or of actions. Even most single words are symbols of specific content only in the context in which they stand in discourse. As instruments of predication word-groups are dynamic, flexible entities which get their signification from their use. How is one to batten down into the reliability of a habit so protean a creature?

Some concepts are peculiar to the fields of thought to which they pertain. With those we are not now concerned. Far the greater part of the elements of language, even of that used in the most abstruse sciences and philosophies, is the common heritage of the race, appropriated in common from infancy by men of every profession. Wherein, then, lies the need of any special effort to ensure precision in the use and the understanding of them? The need lies exactly in this: the habituation is so early and so thorough and rises so rarely to the focus of consciousness that almost universally it results in habits of using symbols without a lively simultaneous awareness of any concrete content for which the symbols might be supposed to stand. That which was originally generic has become so concrete by familiarity that the truly basic materials of thought do not get into consciousness at all<sup>16</sup>. An instance of this—though a rather unimportant one—is the use of metaphorical language without awareness of the non-figurative significance of the words. Such language frequently is the direct expression of feeling, emotion, or sentiment; it is but slightly tinged, therefore, by rational thinking. Far more important is the very common use of phrases or sentences in the belief that one is giving expression to a judgment, when in fact the mind is not aware of any exact meaning or content of the words used<sup>16</sup>. Of equal importance is the frequent failure to derive from words heard or read a lively imagination (comprehension) of the concrete relation (the *meaning* of the words) which is in the mind of the author.

Language, then, as related to rational thinking,

<sup>16</sup>Compare William Carl Ruediger, *The Principles of Education*, 193 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910); "... A man who knows only his own language... has neither the motive for, nor the means of becoming conscious of what language, as such, really is. The language element in his environment is not fully appreciated, and can not be, till the contrast furnished by another tongue makes it evident. This gain from language study is usually called the development of language consciousness..."

What happens is that the meaning of the symbol is first forced into the margin of consciousness and then driven out entirely. Compare Warren (as cited in note 14, above): "... When we think of 'man' the symbol or word forms the central feature (focus) of the experience. Along with the word there may be in the background or margin of the thought fleeting image of some specific man or of certain human characteristics... When we endeavor to examine the meaning of a word, these marginal elements become focalized..." Compare the other citation in note 14, above. All these psychologists in discussing language confine themselves to words as units. What they say is true in equal or greater measure of *predications*.

<sup>16</sup>Compare note 12, above.

has three functions: (1) to enable one to carry generalizations to higher planes, (2) to enable one to convey to other minds the judgment by which he has achieved a generalization, (3) to enable one to comprehend and share the judgments of other minds. Education in rational thinking is possible only to the degree in which language is mastered as an instrument of these three functions. If, then, one asks, *How can one educate?*, the answer is, *He must develop an activity which enforces manipulation of the ordinary and every-day elements of language in such a way that association of these symbols with their concrete meanings becomes habitual, so habitual that the one can not be present in consciousness without the other*<sup>17</sup>. This is prerequisite to higher education in any special field.

### IV. HOW CAN ONE EDUCATE?

It would seem that the obvious material for such an activity is the vernacular, because our thinking and the greater part of our communication with others are to be in that medium. But the Schools have not yet developed a method of studying or of using the vernacular which enforces the presence in consciousness of the significance of the language used, even when the elements of language are manipulated extensively and for many years in succession. Paragraph-comprehension tests furnish evidence of the truth of this statement. It is just here that the study of a foreign language has an advantage over the study of one's own language. One can not translate a page from a foreign tongue *in such a way as to convey the thought to a third person* without concentrating the attention upon the thought as something distinct from (though inherent in) the words and the phrases in which it is expressed. The difference of idiom eliminates, at least to a rather large degree, the possibility of allowing the symbol to be an end in itself beyond which the mind does not probe. The weakness of instruction in foreign languages has been that, because the translations usually are addressed to a person who already knows the content of the original, versions very frequently are accepted which would be incomprehensible to any one not previously initiated into the author's thought.

Can any principle be laid down by which we can decide which foreign languages offer the better material for this discipline? It seems safe to say that, within certain limits, the more remote the idiom of the language is from one's vernacular, the more certainly is one compelled, when he is translating from that language, to give attention to the meaning. Therefore, for English-speaking persons the study of Greek or of Latin has educative value superior to the study of German, of French, or of Spanish (in descending order). It may be asked, Would Chinese be superior to any of these? The correct answer probably is that an overwhelming preponderance of the generalized forms,

<sup>17</sup>The reader is cautioned to note that this is not habituation to the use of symbols (compare the preceding paragraph of the text), but habitual association of the symbols with their meanings.

I am not arguing against the use of labor-saving tools (symbols); but I maintain that the significance of the tool must be sufficiently within the fringe of consciousness to prevent the person from behaving in a manner inconsistent with the meaning of the tool (compare Dewey's chapter on Meaning, in *How We Think*).

molds, or instruments of linguistic expression of the English tongue are universal in the Indo-European languages, whereas the languages of other stocks offer a much more restricted field of practice in these materials and at the same time offer numerous extraneous difficulties which interfere with concentration of attention upon the prime objective.

Some may wish to question the existence of general elements of linguistic expression prerequisite to and distinct from the thought-content of specific sciences and disciplines. We need only remind these sceptics that every grammatical term is living evidence of such generalizations: subject, predicate, object, modifier, the parts of speech, attributes, terms of logical and functional relation, etc., also many details of the arrangement (order) of words, quasi-synonymous expressions, and other rhetorical devices (often used for the conveying of emotional as well as rational mental elements). The mastery of these universal functional components of language (i. e. the ability to use them effectively) probably more than any other characteristic marks off the educated mind from the untrained. The study of foreign language helps also in achieving precision in the use of vernacular words. But in this it is less directly beneficial, at least in respect to technical terms, than the study of the specific sciences to which the terms appertain. There has been a tendency among some who have analyzed the educative value of the study of foreign languages to put undue emphasis upon the study of words and to give too little consideration to mastery of the real units of language, which, as was noted above, are word-groups.

Our conclusion, then, is that, in order to achieve the highest educative value in the study of foreign languages, teachers should direct all energy toward two goals, (1) sentence-analysis, just so far (and only so far) as it is helpful in comprehending and in reexpressing with precision the thought (emphasis should be put on linguistic elements that are common to all Indo-European languages rather than upon those that are peculiar to the one language which is the subject of study), (2) formulation of translation which would be intelligible to persons who have no other means of knowing the thought-content of the original. Everything which is inconsistent with the attainment of these two ends or which trespasses largely upon the time required for such attainment—the study of *Realien*, history, art, political and ethical ideas, and English etymology—should be frankly recognized as forming a study distinct from the study of the foreign language. All these have their value, and many occasions arise in a language-course for devoting, in passing, attention to them. But, when they are introduced, they should be admitted strictly as incidental material and not be allowed to preempt a place which was not intended for them. All of them, even extensive reading of a particular author, can be attained more directly and far more economically in books and translations available in the English language. The purposes should not be confused. They are interrelated: a lively imagination, based upon a detailed knowledge of the realistic background in which an

author wrote, is, of course, indispensable for the intelligent reading of that author. In fact, a far more extensive knowledge is required than can be attained by reading in the original tongue within the time limits practicable in school conditions of the present day. The amount of foreign text to be read in a fixed period of time (e. g. in a school term) should be decided wholly with reference to the two goals which have been set forth above as the legitimate immediate aims of a language course. Under modern conceptions of efficiency each educational end should be approached directly by the course which leads to it with the minimum of wasted time and of ineffectual effort. At present, since we confuse the various purposes and do not concede fully the priority of any, our trend is toward failure to achieve both the one group of desiderates and the other.

More advanced students by digging extensively into the original writings can derive values other than linguistic which can not be gotten either from critical treatises (e. g. histories) or from translations. But this certainly does not apply, unless by rare exception, to the earlier years of High School study. For the best intellectual development those grades are the time par excellence for a linguistic course. On the other hand, for pupils in those years (and largely in later years also) the *direct* path to critical ideas in ethics, politics, and history, and also to English etymology is through the vernacular. If each teacher will bear in mind that the subtle literary qualities which are so hard to define and which escape translation are the only content of the foreign text that is not accessible to his pupils through the mother tongue, he will be likely to conduct his course more intelligently and more fruitfully than when he feels under compulsion to strive for several divergent goals, for the sake of which—he is made to feel—effective linguistic experience must be curtailed.

#### V. SUMMARY

(1) Thought and language are two aspects of one mental phenomenon.

(2) Increase of quantity and improvement of quality of rational thinking are inseparable from increased mastery of language.

(3) Language is divisible into (1) technical terms (chiefly words), the minor part, and (2) forms of expression (chiefly word-groups, or kinds of word-groups), the major part.

(4) Increase of mastery of language (ability to use language) is a process of habit-formation.

(5) Since habits are specific, they are formed only by the use of specific material, namely, in this instance, of linguistic forms of expression (and, in lesser degree, the meanings of words).

(6) The elements of language are symbols for previous mental experiences. The manipulation of symbols is without value except as the meaning of the symbols is present in consciousness (in the fringe, if not in the focus, of attention).

(7) The effort to comprehend the thought-content of a passage in a foreign language compels not only

use of the elements of language, but also simultaneously the focussing of attention upon the meaning of those symbols (in a much greater degree than is the case commonly in the use of the vernacular in school exercises). Consequently it is the most effective exercise for developing the habits which—by and large—are conducive to competency in rational thinking.

(8) Other things being equal, the more difficult the direct association of the foreign symbol with the vernacular symbol, the more certain is the direction of attention to analysis of the thought-content. For this reason Greek and Latin are superior as media for training toward mastery of language to German, French, or Spanish.

(9) While some degree of mastery of language can be attained without direct effort, a study which contributes directly and largely to this end is of prime importance as an educational instrument for any one in whose life rational thinking is to be in any large measure a control<sup>18</sup>.

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### REVIEW

*The Composition of Homer's Odyssey.* By W. J. Woodhouse. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press (1930). Pp. 251. \$4.25.

Professor Woodhouse's volume, *The Composition of Homer's Odyssey*, is a fascinating book, the ripe fruit of a lifelong interest in the *Odyssey*, and written *con amore*. The author's unique rendering of Homeric passages, in which the word-order and the absence of the definite article are admirably reproduced, makes one wish that his translation of the entire poem might be published. Ever and anon a bit of gentle humor and of quaint phraseology escapes the barrier of serious purpose. Above all, the *vis formans* of the argument has been generated not so much by reading what others have written—no work on Homer later than the Scholia is mentioned—as by the author's own lively imagination. The book reads like a detective story. The minor characters are The Components of the *Odyssey*<sup>1</sup>. Some of these are the creation of the author, Professor Woodhouse, and at times, like Milton's Satan, they seem about to crowd out of first place the hero, who is Homer. But in the final chapter the poet emerges triumphant.

A statement of the contents of the volume will be at once interesting and profitable:

I. The Structure and Method of the *Odyssey* (11–16); II. The Subject-matter of the *Odyssey* (17–

<sup>18</sup>If the arguments advanced in this paper are accepted, one is driven to the conclusion that the Report of the Classical Investigation of the American Classical League may prove to be the most deadly blow that has yet been struck at the cause of classical education, because it has led teachers throughout this country to devote a large part of the time and the energy of themselves and of their pupils toward acquiring information and emotional attitudes which can be attained by High School pupils more economically and more precisely without any use of a foreign language. Having posited these informational contacts as the foremost ends in themselves of classical study, the Report has diverted attention from the only real reason for the continuance of Latin and Greek as subjects of study in our Secondary Schools (except for a very small minority of specialists). That reason is to contribute in a way in which no other study can to the creation of competent minds.

<sup>1</sup>Bekker, *Homerische Blätter*, 199–107 (Bonn, 1863).

21); III. The Exordium (22–28); IV. The Wrath of the Gods (29–40); V. The Deep-sea Yarns (41–45); VI. Kirke and Kalypso (46–53); VII. Nausikaa's Romance (54–65); VIII. Penelopeia and her Web (66–71); IX. The Sign of the Scar (72–79); X. Penelopeia's Collapse (80–91); XI. The Twofold Contest (92–97); XII. The Sign of the Bow (98–101); XIII. The Exhibition Shot (102–107); XIV. Telemachos in the Dark (108–115); XV. What the Ghost Said (116–119); XVI. The Sign of the Bed (120–125); XVII. The Man far-traveled (126–136); XVIII. The Return of Odysseus (137–157); XIX. The Removal of the Arms (158–168); XX. The Saga of Odysseus (169–193); XXI. The Faithful Retainer (194–198); XXII. The Loyal Wife (199–207); XXIII. The Quest of Telemachos (208–214); XXIV. Kalypso the Concealer (215–217); XXV. The Components of the *Odyssey* (218–235); XXVI. The strong-wing'd Music of Homer (236–251).

The *dramatis personae* and their respective parts in the plot, in the view of Professor Woodhouse, may be briefly sketched as follows:

I. The Deep-Sea Yarns. They were told in the third person ages before Homer, and are likely to be Minoan. They are used in the Apologue (compare 41–45, 219).

II. Folk Tales, told in prose and in verse generations before Homer. These are five:

A. Woman's Wit, or Playing for Time: The Story of Penelope's Web, "quite inorganic in the *Odyssey*" (220).

B. The Husband Returned, or The Acid Test. Husband and wife are reunited after long years, the husband being recognized by three tests, the Scar, the Bow, and the Bed. Related to this is The Exhibition Shot, introduced in Book 21 solely to provide Odysseus with arrows for the Slaughter.

C. The Grass Widow, or The Nick of Time. In this tale the husband returns while he is still young; therefore he is (supernaturally) disguised. He finds a suitor or two, who conspire with maids and menservants. The Contest of the Bow results from the counter-plot of husband and wife, with the aid of The Faithful Retainer.

D. The Stolen Prince, or Blood Will Tell: The Story of Eumeus.

E. The Dark Horse, or Winning a Wife: Nausicaa and the Phaeacian Episode.

III. The Saga of Odysseus. In this Saga, parts of which Homer himself had sung, Odysseus was only two years in returning from Troy, and visited only places which were known to the Greeks. In the *Odyssey* the Saga is used in the five Lies of Odysseus, in the prophecy of Tiresias (which, however, was given at an Oracle of the Dead in Thesprotia), and in Books 22 and 24.

IV. New parts, invented by Homer. These include, first, The Quest of Telemachus (without Telemachus there would only be a Saga, not a Romance: 248), and, secondly, The Poet's Cement, a score of episodes used for purposes of juncture or embellishment. Chief among these is the story of Calypso, who was created to allow time for Telemachus to grow to manhood.

The author's work is in many ways an *Odyssey* of the Homeric Question, with as many Component Parts as Homer's *Odyssey*. We meet, for example,

Bekker's Defective Proem (22-28), Drerup's Symmetry (43-44)<sup>2</sup>, Seeck's "Bogenkampf" and "Speerkampf" (184)<sup>3</sup>, Bethe's three-fold division of the poem (20)<sup>4</sup>, Cauer's Nick of Time (224)<sup>5</sup>, Finsler's Lateness of the "Göttermaschinerie" (185)<sup>6</sup>, T. W. Allen's reliance on Dictys of Crete for a pre-Homeric version of the story (133)<sup>7</sup>, and many others. The author has also added, as his Homer did, important Component Parts of his own invention, and The Poet's Cement is not lacking. The latter is needed most to adjust the reasons for the detection of the Component Parts with the recognition of supreme poetic qualities in Homer. In this connection we note a few 'contradictions' which are truly 'Homeric'.

(1) One of the three "outstanding and splendid features" of the Odyssey, "the crowning achievement" of Homer, is "The strong, firm, clear-cut and confident lines of the character-drawing . . ." (243). With this contrast these statements: "the collapse of Penelopeia's resistance, without explanation, ruins the logic of the character . . ." (89); ". . . Penelopeia has become—a mere puppet . . ." (90). Compare also the following (200-201): ". . . But what of that disconcerting 'fat hand', in which Penelopeia carries the big key of the storechamber? Oh, Homer! How could you! . . . The total impression left upon one's mind, then, is of a well-nourished lady—of about thirty-five, shall we say?—with a certain maturity of physical charms, a comfortable plump freshness, but without any gift of intellect or strength of character . . ." This reads like Samuel Butler<sup>8</sup>.

(2) With these statements, ". . . Homer has been very careful over these small points" (153, note 38). ". . . Homer excogitated such details with care . . ." (193) contrast ". . . the original old story . . . here so sadly mutilated and dislocated . . ." (64) and "<The trick of the Web>, As it stands . . . appears pointless, without any real bearing upon events . . ." (67).

(3) On page 243 Professor Woodhouse writes, ". . . <Homer's> genius for construction is seen in the selection and disposition of the elements of existing story . . ." Contrast page 88: ". . . the poet's construction hereabouts resembles some ramshackle engine, largely made up of secondhand parts . . ."

Like Homer, too, our author nods.

(1) The adventure with Aeolus shows, he maintains, the character of a Deep-Sea Yarn in which the hero has now one, now several ships, because (42) "the ship is spoken of in the singular, except in three places, where by the slightest of changes the ship becomes a squadron, by a sort of afterthought . . ." The "single ship" is the flagship of the squadron, in which Aeolus

<sup>2</sup>E. Drerup, *Das Fünfte Buch der Ilias*, 361 (Paderborn, 1913); *Homerische Poetik*, 1.439 (Würzburg, 1921).

<sup>3</sup>O. Seeck, *Die Quellen der Odyssee* (Berlin, 1887).

<sup>4</sup>E. Bethe, *Homer: Dichtung und Sage*, 2.4 (Leipzig, 1922).

<sup>5</sup>P. Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik*, 602 (Leipzig, 1923).

<sup>6</sup>G. Finsler, *Homer*, 1.438 (Leipzig, 1914).

<sup>7</sup>T. W. Allen, *Homer: The Origins and Transmissions*, 169 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1924). <For a review of this book, by Professor Frank Cole Babbitt, see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20, 131-135. C. K. >

<sup>8</sup>Samuel Butler, *The Authoress of the Odyssey*, 125-133 (New York. The title-page bears no date; the Preface is dated December 4, 1921). <For a review of this book, by Professor Bassett, see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 18, 29, 30-31. C. K. >

places the bag of the winds and Odysseus covers his head; neither action could take place in the squadron.

(2) 21.422 is taken literally, says Professor Woodhouse (104), from the old folk tale, because the arrow of Odysseus goes *out the doorway* (*θέραπε*), which it could not do in the context. But seven passages (Iliad 5. 694, 16.408, 18.447, 21.29, 237; Odyssey 5.410, 12. 254) prove conclusively that the word *θέραπε* here need have no reference whatsoever to a doorway.

(3) "The expression 'this bow' <*τόδε τόξον*, 19. 586> is proof that the speaker <Odysseus> as he utters the words is actually holding the bow in his hands . . ." (118)—as in the pre-Odyssean folk tale. But *ὅδε* in Homer may be used of what has just been mentioned, as being present in the thoughts of the speaker (Odyssey 16.387, 23.62). Furthermore, *τόξο* must be used here, rather than *τούτο*, because the latter pronoun is used in the same verse to designate the Suitors, who are more remote in the mind of Odysseus than is the bow.

The technique employed in the analysis of the poem is precisely that of the Higher Critics, even in the phraseology: "puts the poet in a quandary . . ." (162, note 7); "bewildering, and curiously scrappy . . ." (182); Penelope is "rather a tiresome body . . ." in the Odyssey—in the Saga she was a real woman (173); "a pale double of Eumaios . . ." (174); "pointless" (175, note 11); "a sort of lurid summary . . ." (175, note 11); treats Telemachus "somewhat scurvy . . ." (180); "In itself, the Quest of Telemachos is inferior to the rest of the poem in interest, in variety of incident, and in dramatic intensity . . ." (209), yet "we can . . . say: 'Without the Quest of Telemachos, no Odyssey' . . ." (211). In the last chapter, however, the author takes back what he has implied in these expressions. One might almost think that the book was intended to be a satire on the Homeric Question, for it illustrates, and even exaggerates, the paradox involved in the attitude of the Higher Critics, that patchwork, botching, contradictions, crudeness exhibited in the adjustment of conflicting material, incorporation of inferior work, and the like, can have produced poetry which has influenced the literature of the western world more profoundly than any other. Yet the conclusion is emphatically Unitarian; the work of the Higher Critics is "highly ingenious as an exercise of imagination; but exercise of imagination it remains, 'sad and laughable and strange'. For the Odyssey stands now in the form in which it was originally designed, complete and perfect in all its parts . . ." (244; the italics are mine).

The author's conclusion may be quoted in part (245-246):

. . . It is of the essence of the view here set forth, that the Odyssey, as it stands, was not the outcome of popular caprice, or of individual caprice, working through generations of bards and rhapsodes, an unholy succession of bedevilers of a beauteous original, the fair lineaments of which we may dimly discern through their sorry botcheries. It was, as it stands, definitely the creation of a single master mind, none other than Homer's, who took up into its construction large masses of older material. This older material, with the exception of the Saga of Odysseus, was originally

quite independent of the story of that hero. It owed its metrical form partly to older generations of bards and story-tellers, partly to Homer himself, who had handled it in the course of his professional career. The *Odyssey*, therefore, owes its origin to a definite conception, and a definite act of selection made at a definite time.

The author's tale has a happy ending, like the *Odyssey*: Homer returns victorious. It may be hailed as a happy presage of the approaching *entente* between Higher Critics and Unitarians, when students of Homer, great and small, forgetting the most recent 'Querelle', shall give their chief attention to Homer's poetry itself, and shall make clearer and more widely known the qualities and the methods by which Homer has enthralled the greater number of those who for nearly three millenniums have known his poems.

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

SAMUEL E. BASSETT

#### CLASSICAL ARTICLES IN NON-CLASSICAL PERIODICALS

## I

American Historical Review—April, Review, favorable, by A. T. Olmstead, of Robert William Rogers, *A History of Ancient Persia, From Its Earliest Beginnings to the Death of Alexander the Great*; Review, generally favorable, by J. J. Van Nostrand, of Moses Hadas, *Sextus Pompey*; Review, favorable, by F. A. Christie, of W. Douglas Simpson, *Julian the Apostate*.

American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures—January, *Parthian Problems*, Neilson Debevoise.

Anglican Theological Review—January, Review, favorable, by Herbert H. Gowen, of Vittorio Macchioro, *From Orpheus to Paul: A History of Orphism*; Short review, uncritical, by W. Freeman Whitman, of Ruth Ellis Messenger, *Ethical Teachings in the Latin Hymns of Medieval England*; Book notice, uncritical, unsigned, of Alfred Loisy, *Les Mystères Paiens et la Mystère Chrétien*, second edition, revised and corrected; Book notice, favorable, unsigned, of Origens Werke, Band IX (Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller, Band XXXV), edited by Max Rauer; April, Long review, favorable, by Frederick C. Grant, of *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Volume VIII, and Volume of Plates III; Review, uncritical, by Frederick C. Grant, of Plotinus on the One and Good: Being the Treatises of the Sixth Ennead, Translated from the Greek, by Stephen Mackenna and B. S. Page; Short review, favorable, unsigned, of *The Oxford Book of Greek Verse*; Short review, favorable, unsigned, of *The Aeneid*, edited by J. W. Mackail; Review, favorable, unsigned, of Plato, *The Republic*, Books I-V, With an English Translation, by Paul Shorey (in *The Loeb Classical Library*).

Archiv für das Studium der Neuen Sprachen—March, Zum Fortleben Tibulls bei Deutschen Dichtern, Friedrich Wilhelm; Review, unfavorable, by Elise Richter, of H. F. Müller, *A Chronology of Vulgar Latin*.

Atlantic Monthly—March, Antrosophy, Stanley Casson [this article includes references to the author's experiences in the caves of Greece]; May, American Education, Albert Jay Nock [at the end of the article the author remarks that "an experiment in educating educable persons only" would be interesting. "Requirements for entrance to the College should be the ability to read and write Latin and Greek prose with such ease and correctness as to show that language difficulties were forever left behind.... The four years' course in College should cover the whole range of Greek and Latin literature from Homer's time to that of Erasmus..."].

Beiblatt zur Anglia—January, Long review, mildly unfavorable, by H. Lüdeke, of Edgar Finley Shannon, *Chaucer and the Roman Poets*; Gray and Catullus, a note by P. C. Ghosh [the author maintains that Catullus 61.81 *tardet ingenuus pudor* is the source of Gray's expression, "ingenuous shame" (Elegy 70)].

Bibliotheca Sacra—April, Review, favorable, by Hugh G. Bevenot, of Karl Loeffler, *Einführung in die Handschriftenkunde*.

Bookman—March, The Humanism of Confucius and Aristotle, Ping-Ho Kuo ["the important similarities that are found in the ethical teachings of Confucius and Aristotle should not, however, blind us to the fact that there are also some differences between these two great masters.... their ethical doctrines are practically identical"]; June, Review, favorable, by Alan Reynolds, of George Moore, *Aphrodite in Aulis*; Review, favorable, by Gerald Sykes, of M. C. D'Arcy and Others, *A Monument to St. Augustine*.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester—January, Bi-Millenary of Vergil's Birth [this is a report of a lecture by R. C. Conway on Vergil and the Greek Religion]; Professor Conway Honoured. Catholic Historical Review—January, Book notice, uncritical, unsigned, of Ruth Ellis Messenger, *Ethical Teachings in the Latin Hymns of Medieval England*; Book notice, favorable, by F. S. T., of Katherine F. Mullany, *Augustine of Hippo: "The First Modern Man"*; April, Review, favorable, by F. A. Walsh, of Georgina Buckler, *Anna Comnena*; Review, favorable, by Roy J. Deferrari, of *Autobiography of Joseph Scaliger: With Autobiographical Selections From His Letters, His Testament, And the Funeral Orations*, by Daniel Heinsius and Dominicus Baudius, Translated into English...by George W. Robinson.

Chicago Theological Seminary Register—March, Review, generally unfavorable, by W. Pauck, of William Pearson Tolley, *The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Augustine*.

Contemporary Review—January, Review, generally unfavorable, by J. E. G. de M., of W. E. Heitland, *Repertita: An Unwilling Restatement of Views on the Subject of the Roman Municipalities*; May, Review, favorable, by J. E. G. de M., of Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law: Its Connection With the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas*, New Edition, With Introduction and Notes,

by the Right Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock; June, Review, favorable, by J. E. G. de M., of The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII, and Volume of Plates III.

Current History—July, Why Go to College?, Albert Bushnell Hart [the author comments at length on the gradual decline of the classical requirements in Colleges and notes that "Yale College will hereafter demand no Latin and no Greek in its entrance requirements or as a stepping-stone on the road that leads to a degree"].

Das Deutsche Buch—May-June, Review, generally very favorable, by Hans Nachod, of Walter Wili, Vergil.

Economic History—January, The Capital Levy in Ancient Athens, A. Andreades ["...a tax as complicated and as oppressive as the *eisphora* cannot be levied in primitive times (such as the seventh century B. C.), and...it has no chance of being tolerated except in periods of financial stress"].

Economic History Review—January, Review, qualifiedly favorable, by M. Rostovtzeff, of William Linn Westermann, Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt.

Englische Studien—Band 65, Heft 2, 1931, The Use of His Sources Made by Shakespeare in *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, Martin Ellehaue ["the source of *Julius Caesar* is generally admitted to be Plutarch's *Lives* solely, and this work is also practically the only source of *Antony and Cleopatra*. Yet a few ideas and phrases are traceable to earlier plays on the subject, especially Daniel's *Cleopatra*, 1594". The subject is dealt with "from three points of view: those of action, character, and language"].

English Historical Review—January, Review, favorable, by D. C. M., of C. H. Cochrane, Thucydides and the Science of History; Short review, very unfavorable, by D. C. M., of Victor Magnien, Les Mystères d' Eleusis; Review, mildly favorable, by E. F. J., of Helen Waddell, Mediaeval Latin Lyrics; April, Review, mildly unfavorable, by D. C. Macgregor, of G. C. Field, Plato and His Contemporaries.

Fortnightly Review—February, Appreciation, favorable, unsigned, of The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VIII.

Forum—February, The Widow of Ephesus: An Old-World Story in the New World-Language, a version by L. W. Lockhart, with Introduction by C. K. Ogden ["basic English—the language into which this famous story of Petronius has been translated—is a purely practical attempt to solve the problem of a universal (auxiliary) language"].

Golden Book—January, Nausicaa, Jean Emmanuel Charles Nodier [this is a short "sequel to *The Odyssey*"].

Harvard Theological Review—October, A Diis Electa: A Chapter in the Religious History of the Third Century, Arthur Darby Nock ["it may therefore seem that there was in the third century a rise of religious sentiment towards Vesta, and that it clothed itself in the only forms which religious sentiment then had to wear: the Vestal who is chosen by the gods is so called not merely because she was *capta* in the ritual form, but because she seemed to have special grace"].

Historical Outlook—April, The Teaching of Ancient History in Schools, T. A. Tuller; Short review, favorable, by W. E. Caldwell, of M. L. W. Laistner, A Survey of the Ancient World.

Historisches Jahrbuch—Volume 50, 1930, Review, favorable, by A. Schnütgen, of B. G. Niebuhr, Die Briefe Barthold Georg Niebuhrs, herausgegeben von D. Gerhard und W. Norvin, Band 2 [covering 1809-1816]; Review, qualifiedly favorably, by Franz Dölger, of F. Lot, L'impôt Foncier et la Capitation Personnelle sous le Bas-Empire et à l'Époque Franque; Brief review, uncritical, by Carl Wegman, of J. Stroux and L. Wenger, Die Augustus-Inschrift auf dem Marktplatz von Kyrene; Review, uncritical, by Carl Wegman, of J. Stroux, Eine Gerichtsreform des Kaisers Claudius.

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
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